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Abstract
High-dimensional quantum key distribution (QKD) allows to achieve information-theoretic secure com-
munications, providing high key generation rates which cannot in principle be obtained by QKD pro-
tocols with binary encoding. Nonetheless, the amount of experimental resources needed increases as
the quantum states to be detected belong to a larger Hilbert space, thus raising the costs of practical
high-dimensional systems. Here, we present a novel scheme for fiber-based 4-dimensional QKD, with
time and phase encoding and one-decoy state technique. Quantum states transmission is tested over
different channel lengths up to 145 km of standard single-mode fiber, evaluating the enhancement of
the secret key rate in comparison to the three-state 2-dimensional BB84 protocol, which is tested
with the same experimental setup. Our scheme allows to measure the 4-dimensional states with a
simplified and compact receiver, where only two single-photon detectors are necessary, thus making it
a cost-effective solution for practical and fiber-based QKD.
Introduction
As the constant advancement in quantum computing is
threatening the security of current cryptographic sys-
tems, our society needs an alternative technology to
safely transmit sensitive data and confidential infor-
mation [1]. A quantum-proof solution to safely de-
liver our cryptographic keys is quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD), which exploits quantum states of light as
safeguarded bit carriers over untrusted communication
channels [2–5]. In well-established QKD protocols such
as the BB84 [2], each bit of the key is carried by a sin-
gle photon, which is prepared in order to span a set of
different quantum states belonging to a 2-dimensional
Hilbert space, i.e. qubits. High-dimensional QKD
protocols were introduced more recently [6, 7], prov-
ing how n = log2(d) > 1 bits of information can be
safely encrypted on each single photon, by preparing
an enlarged set of states belonging to a d-dimensional
Hilbert space. Such states are called qudits. The
higher information capacity of qudits allows for an opti-
mized exploitation of the photon budget at the trans-
mitter; at the same time it also mitigates the issue
of saturation in the receiver’s single-photon detectors.
Moreover, using high-dimensional states improves the
robustness to the noise affecting the communication,
allowing for a higher threshold value of the quantum
bit error rate (QBER). The result is an increase in the
secret key rate achievable by high-dimensional QKD,
as compared with standard QKD protocols with binary
encoding (d = 2), at least until the overall losses are
low enough to keep negligible the random dark counts
at the receiver [8–10].
Although there are many degrees of freedom to be ex-
ploited to send more than one bit per photon [11–
15], time-bin and time-energy encoding are the ones
more suitable for single-mode fiber propagation, and
thus more compatible with the already existing and
widespread fiber networks [16–23]. Recent demon-
strations of one-way fiber-based QKD include the
record-breaking key rate of 26.2 Mbit/s at 4 dB chan-
nel loss [19], achieved with a 4-dimensional time-bin
protocol with two decoy states, which is proven to be
robust against the most general (or coherent) attacks
as well as finite-size effects. However, the apparent gain
in the key rate comes with a cost, as the preparation
and measurement of high-dimensional states require a
larger amount of experimental resources, especially at
the receiver, who has to project the incoming qudits
on two unbiased bases of d orthogonal states. For
instance, to perform the time-bin protocol presented
in [19], at least three cascaded interferometers and five
single-photon detectors are necessary to measure the 4-
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dimensional states (actually three more detectors were
added in the cited work, in order to reduce saturation
effects in the first basis measurements). On the other
hand, a simpler receiver with only two single-photon
detectors is sufficient in many of the binary-encoded
protocols with the same level of security, such as the
BB84 [21,24,25].
In this work we present an alternative scheme for 4-
dimensional QKD with time-bin encoding, which al-
lows to implement a simplified and more compact re-
ceiver, where only two single-photon detectors are nec-
essary for measuring all the quantum states. The secu-
rity of this protocol against general attacks is demon-
strated in a finite-key scenario, when a simple and effi-
cient one-decoy state method is implemented. Qudits
exchange was tested over different fiber channels up to
145 km of length, corresponding to 31.5 dB of transmis-
sion loss. In addition to this, in order to evaluate the
improved performances of our protocol, we tested also
a 2-dimensional BB84 scheme over the same channel
lengths, by employing mostly the same experimental
setup. To be noted that both QKD systems employ
two single-photon detectors, i.e., the new proposal is
cost-effective. This method allowed us to make a fair
and rational comparison between the two time-bin pro-
tocols with d = 2 and d = 4. In the following sections,
we describe the two protocols and we report the se-
curity analysis of our new scheme. We then show the
experimental setup of the transmitter and the receiver.
Finally, our results are presented and discussed in the
last section of the paper.
Protocols
Figure 1 schematically depicts the quantum states and
mutually unbiased bases belonging to the two different
QKD schemes that were performed in this work. The
2- and 4-dimensional protocols implemented are the
three-state time-bin BB84 and one of its possible gener-
alizations in 4 dimensions, respectively. Both schemes
are secure against general eavesdropping attacks that
are addressed to the transmission channel, as discussed
later for a finite-key analysis. Defining τ as the bin du-
ration, each qubit and qudit has a time span of two and
four bins respectively. In both cases, quantum states
of the Z basis are adopted for key bits encoding, while
the X basis is implemented only for security checking.
In the three-state BB84 [21], quantum states belonging
to the Z basis differ for the time bin occupied by the
photon and only one bit, corresponding to early or late
bin occupation, is encoded on each state. The third
state is the superposition of the two Z basis states with
0 relative phase, while the other orthogonal state in the
X basis (with pi relative phase) is not prepared, thus
making this protocol a simplified version of the original
four-state BB84. Here, the projection on the Z basis is
Figure 1: Quantum states involved in the two
QKD protocols. The three states belonging to the 2-
dimensional BB84 (a) and the eight states belonging to the
novel 4-dimensional protocol (b). τ is the time bin dura-
tion, while 0 and pi specify the relative phase between the
different time bins occupied by the photon.
made at the receiver by measuring the photon arrival
time with a single-photon detector, while the X basis
is measured by monitoring, with another single-photon
detector, one of the two outputs of a Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometer with a delay equal to τ . Whenever weak
coherent pulses are prepared instead of single-photons
(as in our case), an efficient one-decoy scheme can be
implemented in order to avoid photon number splitting
attacks [26,27]. The secret key length `2D per privacy
amplification block is then given by the following for-
mula:
`2D ≤ DZ0 + DZ1
[
1− h(φZ)] − λEC
− 6 log2(19/sec) − log2(2/corr)
(1)
where DZ0 and D
Z
1 are the lower bounds of vacuum
events and single-photon events in the Z basis, h(·) is
the binary entropy function, φZ is the upper bound on
the phase error rate and λEC is the number of bits that
are publicly announced during error correction, while
sec and corr are the secrecy and correctness parame-
ters [28].
The direct generalization in 4 dimensions of the time-
bin BB84 is the protocol presented in [19], where the
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four qudits belonging to the Z basis differ only for the
time bin which is individually occupied among the four
bins available, and each state of the X basis is a super-
position of all the four bins, combined with different
relative phases. In that case, the projection on the
Z basis is made simply with a detector measuring the
time of arrival of the photons, as for the 2-dimensional
protocol. On the other hand, the projection on the mu-
tually unbiased X basis requires a more complicated
setup, with at least a cascade of three interferometers
and four detectors (as reported in [19] and [29]) or even
more complex solutions (as discussed in [30]).
In our new scheme we exploit two more convenient
4-dimensional bases, that are depicted in Figure 1b.
Here, we have two time bins combined for each state
in both bases, and the four states that are defined on
consecutive bins are employed for key encoding in the
Z basis. Qudits belonging to the same basis are or-
thogonal to each other and the two bases are mutually
unbiased, since the general relation
∣∣∣〈zn|xm〉∣∣∣2 = 1
d
(2)
is still satisfied for all |zn〉 and |xm〉 states belonging
to Z and X basis respectively (n,m = 0, ..., d−1). For
this scheme, the projection on the Z basis is made with
one single τ -delayed interferometer, while the projec-
tion on the X basis requires a single 2τ -delayed inter-
ferometer. This makes it possible to hugely simplify the
experimental setup at the receiver side, in comparison
to ref. [19], as it is further described in the following
section.
The secret key length `4D per privacy amplification
block is given by:
`4D ≤ 2DZ0 + DZ1
[
2−H(φZ)] − λEC
− 6 log2(19/sec) − log2(2/corr)
(3)
where H(x) := −x log2(x/3)−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the
Shannon entropy in a 4-dimensional Hilbert space. The
lower and upper bounds on the single-photon events in
the equation above are obtained by using the one-decoy
technique appearing in ref. [27], modified for the 4-
dimensional QKD protocol. The difference between the
original one-decoy protocol [27] and the one presented
here is the method to find the upper bound to the
vacuum events, DZ,u0 . In the 4-dimensional QKD each
basis measurement has four possible outputs, meaning
that the probability of error due to a vacuum event is
3/4. By exploiting this fact, the vacuum events can
be bounded by the total number of errors mZ,k in the
Z basis corresponding to the decoy intensity k. By
correcting the estimated quantities using the finite-key
technique presented in ref. [27], the upper bound to the
vacuum events is given by the following expression:
DZ0 ≤ DZ,u0 :=
4
3
[
τ0
ek
pk
(
mZ,k +
√
mZ
2
log
1
ε2
)
+
√
nZ
2
log
1
ε1
]
(4)
where τ0 =
∑
k∈κ pke
−k is the total probability to send
the vacuum state, pk is the probability to prepare the
decoy state of intensity k, nZ and mZ are, respectively,
the total number of detections and the total number of
errors in the Z basis.
Experimental setup
The experimental setup of the two QKD schemes per-
formed is illustrated in Figure 2. The transmitter (Al-
ice) is very similar in both cases: a train of weak co-
herent pulses is prepared from a continuous-wave (CW)
laser emitting at 1550 nm, by means of sequential in-
tensity modulators (IM). We employed two cascaded
IMs in order to optimize the pulse carving, while a
third one is used for implementing the one-decoy state
technique. A phase modulator (PM) modulates the
relative phase between the time bins, necessary for qu-
dits preparation. Finally, a variable optical attenuator
(VOA) is used to reach the single-photon level before
sending the pulses into the fiber channel. All the opti-
cal modulators at the transmitter side are driven with
a field programmable gate array (FPGA). For carving
the CW laser we used a custom sequence of electrical
pulses (of about 150 ps of width), which already in-
cludes Alice’s state and basis choice. The time bin du-
ration is τ = 840 ps, resulting in a qubit rate of about
595 MHz and a qudit rate of approximately 297.5 MHz.
A pseudo random binary sequence (PRBS) of 212 − 1
symbols and a symbol width of d·τ (with d = 2 or 4 de-
pending on the protocol) is used to drive the third IM,
in order to send the two different intensity levels cor-
responding to signal (µ1) and decoy (µ2) states. With
this configuration, the probability to send µ1 or µ2 is
fixed to 50% (for both qubits and qudits preparation)
and can not be optimized for each different channel
loss. To prepare the qudits, another PRBS of 212 − 1
symbols and a symbol width equal to τ is used to drive
the PM. Please notice that the phase randomization of
quantum states (required to guarantee the security of
the decoy-state method) can be easily performed with
another phase modulator, or by employing a pulsed
laser source working in gain-switching mode [21,31].
At the receiver side (Bob) two overlapped free-space
interferometers were installed, as shown in Figure 2b.
The short arm is in common, while the long arm is
selected between two different paths (with delay equal
to τ and 2τ) by means of two polarizing beam split-
ters (PBS). Light with vertical polarization is reflected
3
Figure 2: Experimental setup for the two QKD schemes. Transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob) employed to
test the three-state BB84 (a) and the 4-dimensional protocol (b). Black lines represent fiber optic and electrical cables
while red lines stand for free-space propagation. The same setup was employed to test both protocols, thus the three-state
BB84 was performed by using one of the two overlapped interferometers that are shown in (b). IM: intensity modulator,
PM: phase modulator, VOA: variable optical attenuator, FPGA: Field Programmable Gate Array, PC: polarization
controller, BS: beam splitter, PBS: polarizing beam splitter, SPAD: single-photon avalanche detector. τ and 2τ are the
delays in time corresponding to the two overlapped interferometers at the receiver side.
by the PBS and follows the τ delay-line, while hor-
izontally polarized light is transmitted by the PBS
and follows the 2τ delay-line. To perform our mea-
surements, the polarization of quantum pulses enter-
ing Bob’s station was manually adjusted with a fiber-
based polarization controller (PC). The overall loss of
the τ -delayed and 2τ -delayed interferometer is 2.3 dB
and 2.5 dB respectively, due to imperfect beam split-
ting and fiber coupling at the detectors. Additional
losses of about 9.2 dB are due to the detection ef-
ficiency (20%) and timing resolution (200 ps) of the
single-photon avalanche detectors (SPADs). The de-
tectors dead time is 20 µs, therefore their click rate sat-
urates when it approaches the value of 50 kHz.
To perform the 2-dimensional protocol, the receiver
passively selects his basis with a beam splitter (BS), as
it is shown in Figure 2a. One SPAD measures the time
of arrival while the other SPAD monitors an output
of the τ -delayed interferometer. A time tagging unit,
which is synchronized with Alice’s FPGA via a clas-
sical channel, collects the electrical outputs from the
two SPADs and finally transmits the acquired data to
Bob’s computer. The polarization of free-space light
is kept aligned with the vertical direction while test-
ing the three-state BB84. Please notice that, to per-
form this protocol, the two PBS can be replaced with
two standard mirrors, which make unnecessary the po-
larization controlling. However, here both protocols
were tested with the same experimental setup, thus
one of the two overlapped interferometers of the 4-
dimensional scheme (shown in Figure 2b) was employed
to perform also the three-state BB84.
In order to test the 4-dimensional protocol, both out-
puts of the interferometers were monitored with the
two SPADs, and basis selection at the receiver is made
by manually switching the polarization between the
two directions (Figure 2b). This means that only one
of the two 4-dimensional bases was prepared and mea-
sured at a time and therefore, no real-time basis choice
was performed for the 4-dimensional protocol during
this experiment (on the other hand, the three-state
BB84 was tested with real time basis choice at both
the transmitter and the receiver sides). The interfer-
ence of 4-dimensional states is observed in the second
and fourth time bins for the Z basis measurements,
and in the third and fourth time bins for the X basis
measurements. The receiver can uniquely determine
the output of his projection by observing the time bin
and the detector at which the click occurs. To be noted
that, even though the observed time bins at the detec-
tion output are correlated with the polarization of in-
coming light, this does not represent an advantage for
the eavesdropper, who is still unable to control the de-
tection efficiency in Bob’s measurement bases without
being noticed. Anyway, adding a polarizer in front of
Bob’s setup would definitely filter out any component
of residual light in the wrong polarization.
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Figure 3: Error rates measured for each protocol.
Quantum bit error rate (QBER) and upper bound on the
phase error rate (φZ) experimentally measured for the two
protocols, at the different channel losses.
Results and discussion
The two QKD schemes were tested over different chan-
nel lengths of standard single-mode fiber. The experi-
mental parameters and results are summarized in Ta-
ble 1. For each transmission channel we experimen-
tally set, at the transmitter side, the optimal values
for the mean photon number of signal and decoy states
(µ1 and µ2), that were previously estimated in order
to maximize the secret key rate (SKR) achievable by
each protocol. As already mentioned, the probability
to send µ1 or µ2 is fixed to 50% in our experimental
setup.
For the three-state BB84 we used a pulse sequence on
the FPGA consisting of 90% of Z basis states, thus
the basis choice at the transmitter is pAliceZ = 0.9 for
all channel lengths. At the receiver side we set pBobZ
equal to 0.5 or 0.9 (see Table 1), depending on the
splitting ratio of the BS that was selected in order to
maximize the SKR. For the 4-dimensional protocol we
tested only one basis at a time, thus the probabilities
pAliceZ , p
Bob
Z were numerically set during the evaluation
of the final SKR. We fixed pAliceZ = 0.9 as for the 2-
dimensional protocol, and again we selected pBobZ from
two different values (0.7 or 0.5, see Table 1) in order to
get the highest SKR at each channel length.
From the acquired data we evaluated the quantum bit
error rate in the Z basis (QBER) and in the X ba-
sis, which gives the upper bound on the phase error
rate (φZ). Notice that with this terminology (the same
adopted in most of the previous works) we always refer
to the symbol-error rate, which exactly matches the
bit-error rate only in the 2-dimensional case. These
data are plotted in Figure 3 for both protocols. As
expected, the error rates appear to increase with the
Figure 4: Secret key rate as a function of channel
loss. Each point represents the secret key rate evaluated
from the experimental data. Dashed lines reproduce the
simulated behaviour of the secret key rate achievable by
our setup, for the two QKD protocols.
channel loss, due to the random noise counts which
become more and more significant as we leave the sat-
uration regime of the single-photon detectors. Noise
counts include the detectors dark counts, the back-
ground photons entering in the fibers, and also the im-
perfect modulation of light pulses at the transmitter
side. The QBER is lower for the 2-dimensional pro-
tocol, since measuring only the arrival time of weak
pulses is generally more straightforward than measur-
ing also their phase, which requires the interference to
be maximized and stabilized. On the other hand, φZ is
lower in the 4-dimensional case, since here the photons
are collected simultaneously from both outputs of each
interferomenter. This configuration, where both out-
puts are monitored at the same time, practically results
in a more stable optimization of interference during the
acquisition. As a consequence, the measurement of rel-
ative phase exhibits less noise, as compared with the
2-dimensional protocol, where only a single output of
the interferometer is monitored during the acquisition.
Moreover, since the measurement method of the two
bases is the same in the 4-dimensional case (involving
both phase and time simultaneously), the values of the
QBER and φZ are more similar to each other, in com-
parison to the error rates of the 2-dimensional protocol,
where each basis is measured in a different way (involv-
ing only phase or only time separately). The value of
φZ also depends on the total amount of detections in
each basis and is affected by the different setting of
pBobZ .
From Bob’s detection data we computed the final SKR
achievable in a finite-key scenario, by setting a block
size of nZ = 107 in the Z basis, and a secrecy and
correctness parameters of 10−9. In Table 1 is reported
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Table 1: Experimental parameters and results. Here are reported the values that we set at the transmitter and the
receiver for each fiber channel, such as the mean photon number for signal and decoy states (µ1, µ2) and the probabilities
to prepare and measure the Z basis (pAliceZ , pBobZ ). From the acquired data we measured the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) and the upper bound on the phase error rate (φZ) in the Z basis; then we evaluated the final secret key rate
(SKR). The block size is fixed to 107 for all channel lengths. The state preparation rate (R) is 595 MHz for qubits and
297.5 MHz for qudits.
transmission
channel
length 25 km 65 km 105 km 145 km
loss 5.1 dB 14 dB 23 dB 31.5 dB
2-dimensional
three-state BB84
protocol
(R = 595 MHz)
µ1 0.07 0.12 0.26 0.31
µ2 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.15
pAliceZ 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
pBobZ 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.5
QBER 1.1% 1.1% 1.4% 2.3%
φZ 6.6% 9.2% 8.9% 13.6%
SKR 15 kbit/s 12 kbit/s 5.1 kbit/s 0.53 kbit/s
SKR/R 2.6× 10−5 2.0× 10−5 8.7× 10−6 8.9× 10−7
4-dimensional
protocol
(R = 297.5 MHz)
µ1 0.10 0.20 0.21 0.18
µ2 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.08
pAliceZ 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
pBobZ 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5
QBER 3.4% 3.4% 4.9% 7.9%
φZ 3.9% 4.6% 5.7% 7.2%
SKR 37 kbit/s 24 kbit/s 5.5 kbit/s 0.42 kbit/s
SKR/R 1.2× 10−4 7.9× 10−5 1.8× 10−5 1.4× 10−6
also the secret fraction SKR/R, which estimates how
many secret key bits can be extracted from each quan-
tum state that is initially prepared. Our results, which
are plotted in Figure 4, show an enhancement of the
SKR achievable by the 4-dimensional protocol for the
first two experimental points, for which the SKR is
increased by a factor 2.4 and 2.0 respectively. For
higher channel loss, the SKR decreases faster than
in the three-state protocol, in agreement with the ex-
pected behaviour which is represented by the dashed
lines in Figure 4. Indeed, our experimental setup al-
lows to extract a secret key up to 39 dB channel loss
with the three-state BB84, and up to 34 dB with the
4-dimensional protocol. This is due to the fact that a
random noise count has 1−1/d probability to generate
an error at the receiver, where d is the dimension of the
encoding: the higher the Hilbert space dimension, the
more effective is the random noise at the receiver. On
the other hand, the doubled information capacity and
the enhanced resilience to state perturbations, make it
possible to increase the SKR by more than a factor 2 in
the saturation regime of the single-photon detectors. In
addition, the secret fraction SKR/R is improved by the
4-dimensional protocol for all the experimental points
(as shown in Table 1): less photons are necessary to
deliver the same secret key. This means that if we pre-
pare the qudits at the same rate as used for the qubits,
we can increase the SKR for all of the four channel
lengths.
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Conclusions
In conclusion, we have presented a fiber-based 4-
dimensional QKD protocol with an efficient time and
phase encoding scheme, which has the advantage to
require a very simple and compact setup at the re-
ceiver. This novel QKD scheme was experimentally
tested over different channel lengths, and its perfor-
mances were compared with the three-state BB84, a
well-established 2-dimensional protocol which was also
tested in this work. Mostly the same experimental
setup was employed to test the two protocols, includ-
ing the same amount of single-photon detectors at the
receiver, as well as the same time-bin duration (which
resulted in a halved preparation rate of 4-dimensional
states at the transmitter). In this configuration, we
demonstrated an enhancement of the secret key rate by
a factor 2.4 in the saturation regime of the detectors,
by testing only one 4-dimensional basis at a time. In
the future, we plan to perform a real-time basis choice
at the receiver, by adding a polarization switcher (an
off-the shelf component for fiber-based telecommunica-
tions). This new device will introduce an extra loss at
the receiver (of about 2 dB), which in any way is low
enough to not affect the improved performances of our
4-dimensional scheme in the saturation regime. More-
over, the effect of this extra loss can be easily balanced
by reducing the other sources of loss at the receiver,
or by optimizing all of the experimental parameters at
the transmitter side (such as the basis choice and the
decoy probabilities, that were both fixed during this
experiment). Furthermore, our system could be easily
modified to implement the two-decoy state technique,
which is more resilient to noise. This would allow us
to optimize the protocol for each configuration of the
experimental parameters, increasing the overall perfor-
mance once more.
Our demonstration proves that high-dimensional quan-
tum systems allow a notable improvement in the
key generation process as compared with the binary-
encoding case. At the same time, no extra expensive
resources are necessary for the full implementation of
such a system. Thus, our experiment paves the way
towards a wider use of high-dimensional encoding in
quantum communication.
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